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Editorial
It is awkward to wake up as one of the lecturers of a
summer school on logic, wondering whether you actu-
ally like logic at all. Unfortunately this is what hap-
pened to me a week ago, when lecturing at the European
Summer School on Logic, Language and Information;
see the short resume in this edition.
I was lucky to be guest-editing The Reasoner at that
point, because this allowed me to challenge my feeling
that logic concerns pointless figments of the imagina-
tion. And indeed, within a week I had reasoned myself
back into a much more stimulating relation to logic.
I was greatly helped in this regard by a course from
Michiel van Lambalgen, professor of logic and cogni-
tive science at the University of Amsterdam. The course
description looked totally outrageous, and I was not
disappointed. Van Lambalgen argues, convincingly I
think, that from the ashes of old-school logic in cog-
nitive science, symbolic representation of reasoning is
once again spreading its wings. More on this phoenix
of logic can be found in the interview.
This Reasoner also features a piece by Marian Couni-
han, one of Van Lambalgen’s PhD students, who will
defend her dissertation ‘Looking for logic in all the
wrong places’ this October. She calls into question the
seeming simplicity of the first Aristotelian syllogism,
thereby illustrating a point that is also discussed in the
interview: in getting from a set reasoning task to a piece
of logic, the reasoner has to traverse a whole world of
interpretative issues.
Apart from that, my task was
made very easy indeed. Guest-
editing The Reasoner is quite pos-
sibly the most easy and relaxed of
all guest-editing. Lots of thanks
go to the the managing editors of
The Reasoner, Federica Russo and
Jon Williamson, for asking me to







Interview with Michiel van Lambalgen
Michiel van Lambalgen is professor of logic and cog-
nitive science at the Philosophy Department of the Uni-
versity of Amsterdam. In the 1980s and early 90s he
was active in mathematical logic, publishing mainly on
the notion of randomness. At the turn of the millenium
he switched to cognitive science. He is currently in-
volved in two research programmes, ‘Logic meets Psy-
chology: nonmonotonicity’, and ‘Reasoning and the
Brain’.
I meet van Lambalgen just after his
last lecture at ESSLLI 2008 (Hamburg),
where over the course of 5 days he
has developed a coherent picture of
language use, brain function, plan-
ning and reasoning, with logic right
at the centre. He has just ex-
plained that Attention Deficit Hy-
peractivity Disorder (ADHD) can
be seen as a problem with goal
maintainance in complex tasks.
Within van Lambalgen’s picture,
goal maintainance is tied up with
the use of tense in discourse. And indeed, experiments
confirm that children with ADHD have more trouble
with using tense in recounting a story.
I ask my first question, on the methodology of this
enterprise, when still in class, but we continue discus-
sion over a mint tea next to one of Hamburg’s cinemas.
Jan Willem Romeijn. I want to discuss your most
recent book, ‘Human Reasoning and Cognitive Science’
(MIT 2008), written with Keith Stenning. But I would
rather start at the other temporal end of your research.
Can you tell about the intellectual history of this book?
Michiel van Lambalgen. In the 80’s I did research
on randomness, but after some time I felt the subject
was too abstract. So in the 90’s I moved into the field
of artificial intelligence. One can really not sink much
lower than that... However, from artificial intelligence I
did pick up a methodology for studying cognition: the
work of David Marr, who separates out three related
levels of cognition (information, algorithm, and imple-
mentation) with an increasingly prominent role for the
constraints imposed by the material brain. The way in
which these levels relate determines how biology im-
poses constraints on cognition. It then struck me that
logical systems can be quite good for a formal charac-
terisation of the informational level of cognitive pro-
cesses. At this time I also developed an interest in
the semantics of natural language, viewed as informa-
tive about human cognition, and in the psychology of
reasoning. Logical formalisations of the informational
level has been quite fruitful in these fields.
JWR. And what did you find in the psychology of
reasoning?
MvL. I was surprised at the complete lack of knowl-
edge of logic among psychologists of reasoning. After
easily dismissing classical logic as the logic of reason-
ing because test results seemed to show that subjects do
not reason according to classical logic, they would pro-
duce half-baked systems of their own and take them as
the algorithms. The mistake of much of the psychology
of reasoning, e.g., research on Wason’s task, is that it
takes the cognitive task construal at the informational
level for granted, and immediately focuses on the algo-
rithmic level. It leads to a false picture of what mind
and/or brain are doing when engaging in the task. Sub-
jects do not look for an answer given a task setup, rather
they are trying to get clear what the task is in the first
place.
JWR. Then how did you end up writing a book with
Keith Stenning, who is after all a psychologist of rea-
soning?
MvL. Obviously Keith is not among these erring psy-
chologists. I spent a very fruitful sabbatical with him
at Edinburgh University in 1999. We started consider-
ing a much wider array of possible logics for fitting the
experimental findings, and crucially, we considered the
engagement of subjects in the reasoning tasks not as in-
ference within the task, but rather as their attempt to fig-
ure out what the task is. In our view, subjects were ‘rea-
soning towards an interpretation’, trying to complete a
coherent picture from the task setup, and not reasoning
from a fixed interpretation towards an answer within the
task.
JWR. Is this the central claim of your book?
MvL. This is an important claim in the book, but
there is more. We think that logic has been discarded
too easily as part of cognitive science, due to the com-
bined pressures of connectionism, Bayesianism and the
presumed results of the psychology of reasoning; and
we try to set that straight. But we also want to relate
the psychology of reasoning to other psychological dis-
ciplines, opening up the ghetto that it is at the moment.
This is why we include research on clinical psychology,
for example autism. Based on a logical model of so-
called executive function together with data on autistic
dysfunctions in the executive domain, we could predict
deviant reasoning patterns in autists; and these predic-
tions have been confirmed.
JWR. How does your other book, ‘The Proper Treat-
ment of Events’ (Blackwell, 2004) written together with
Fritz Hamm, fit into this picture?
MvL. Hamm and I describe how our understanding
of ordinary discourse can be related to a semantics for
natural language that uses Logic Programming (LP) and
a particular set of predicates for capturing notions of
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causality. The minimal models from LP provide the
default interpretation of sentences, leading to the typ-
ical nonmonotonic inferences that we find in subjects.
Subjects hearing ‘John was crossing the street’ com-
pute a minimal model in LP. In this model John is at
some point reaching the other side. But if the sentence
is followed by ‘... when a truck hit him’, we expect
a nonmonotonic recomputation of the model in which
John does not reach the other side. This use of LP is the
backdrop for much of the discussion in the reasoning
book.
JWR. And can the process of seeking meaning in a
reasoning task be described by such a logic?
MvL. Well, that is the holy grail. In the process of
interpreting a reasoning task, subjects are indeed trying
to complete some minimal model of all the input they
receive. But they have to strike a subtle balance: de-
ciding what words play key parts (syntax), what these
words mean (semantics), and how the sentences in the
task are suppose to relate (validity). Often subjects fail
to reach a balance, and so, from an LP perspective, they
fail to build up a satisfactory minimal model. Moreover,
much of the interpretation process is influenced by the
pragmatics of a task setup: if the experimenter has a
high social status, for example, people are more likely
to take sentences that she submits for testing as truths.
JWR. It looks like this will keep you busy for the rest
of your academic career. Will it?
MvL. Remember that I already switched fields twice.
I will certainly do that again. In fact, I am planning to
writing a book about Kant’s logic!
JWR. Why that?!
MvL. Kant’s logic has a bad reputation among
philosophers and logicians alike, as being an unimagi-
native version of traditional Aristotelian and Stoic logic
as it is presented in the textbooks of his time. The Table
of Judgements, on which the Table of the Categories is
based, is usually not taken seriously from a logical point
of view, which follows Frege in attributing to Kant a
much too narrow view of judgement. But a closer look
shows that Kant had genuine worries about the validity
of logical laws and voices concerns that were taken up
in the 20th century by so-called proof theoretic seman-
tics, developed by Dummett and Prawitz. From this per-
spective, a considerable part of Kant’s ‘transcendental
logic’ can be fitted into logic proper. A view along these
lines has been forcefully suggested by Batrice Longue-
nesse, in her Kant and the capacity to judge.
JWR. Does that not imply a major change of skills
as well? You will need to do some genuine historical
research, I suppose.
MvL. Of course I am helped by excellent studies on
Kant, for example by Longuenesse. But I also believe
that ideas of great philosophers can be meaningfully
reinterpreted in a more modern setting, without staying
true to the historical facts in all respects. In this case:
if Kant had had the vocabulary of cognitive science and
logic, he would have said this-or-that. I am looking to
fill in the ‘this-or-that’ and then show that the result is
highly relevant. I am not thereby trying to reconstruct
Kant’s own vocabulary. That project is rather like the
so-called authentic interpretation of classical music. Of
course you can try to make music sound exactly as it
must have sounded in Beethoven’s time, but that is not
to say that Beethoven would not have been overjoyed
by the possibilities of a Steinway grand piano.
How obvious is logic, really?
Consider the following:
All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
Nothing seems more straightforward than the log-
ical inference made in the above argument; indeed, if
you are reading this article you have probably first seen
it in an introductory logic class, and in many forms
since then. Obviously, anyone with some sense im-
mediately discerns the logical form of these premises;
there’s really no room for discussion. At least that’s
how it is presented. But how transparent is the logic of
such an argument, really? I’ll argue that it’s not. In this
brief article I’ll suggest that arguments like these carry
strong encultured ideas about the meaning of such
sentences and their role in a logical argument, which
make it transparent only through some rather special
coloured lenses. What is obvious in logic class is by no
means obvious outside of it.
Some of the cultural understanding required by such
an argument becomes evident when interrogating peo-
ple who haven’t had the privilege of an education. Com-
mon responses from unschooled reasoners, when pre-
sented with a pair of premises containing a universally
quantified premise and a particular one, are questions
about the extent of the quantifier’s domain, and the re-
lation of the entity named in the particular premise to
this domain. So, given the above premises, you might
anticipate the retort, ‘But Socrates is dead—he’s not a
man anymore’ (or perhaps the admission that Socrates
must be mortal because he’s dead). Well, this is rather
an academic fiction, since premises involving ancient
Greek philosophers wouldn’t go down so well with un-
schooled reasoners, but the pattern is true to empirical
findings in this area. Luria’s well-known research with
peasants in Soviet Russia led him to conclude that sub-
jects did not understand or respect the universal nature
of the premises (1976: Cognitive development: its cul-
tural and social foundations, HUP).
In fact, when the construction all x is used in sponta-
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neous speech it is almost never operating on a universal
domain, but rather on a severely constrained, contextu-
ally defined, sub-domain. Try it yourself—when you
catch yourself using ‘all’ to quantify some entity you’ll
notice your domain is generally very small. Given this,
concern about the position of any named entity in or
outside the domain becomes legitimate. The question
becomes: why are schooled subjects so comfortable
with universally quantified sentences? Why did the ar-
gument I opened with seem so obvious?
In the given example several factors are working to-
gether to make the argument form accessible. Firstly,
there’s only one quantifier. Secondly, both premises
are believable. But this ease of management we have
with the given argument only extends to a small range
of familiar argument forms. Add in another quantified
premise, make the premises less believable, and you’ll
lose half your audience (as Oakhill et al. showed in their
1989 Cognition article). Combine two different quanti-
fiers, such as all and some . . . not, and any trace of trans-
parency is lost for the majority of subjects. The logical
system is still there of course, but it’s not as obvious—
and now suddenly it becomes easier to imagine that dis-
cerning logical form involves practice, a learned ability
of a particular way of looking at the sentences.
More surprisingly, take a sentence whose grammat-
ical form is not as faithful to the predictable ‘logic’
of what’s claimed, and educated subjects will choose
the latter over the former. Fillenbaum showed this
to great effect in his 1978 study of perverse threats
and promises, in which subjects happily added or re-
moved negations in supposedly logically equivalent
paraphrases of the original sentences, the majority
adamant they hadn’t changed the meaning of the sen-
tence in doing so (‘How to do some things with IF’,
in the volume Semantic factors in cognition, Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates). Fillenbaum’s subjects converted
such sentences as ‘Clean up the mess or I won’t report
you’ into sentences such as ‘If you don’t clean up the
mess I’ll report you’, thereby making a more typical
threat of the sentence.
It seems that subjects exercise continuous discrimi-
nation in what is encoded into logical form and what
not, from natural language contexts. Are they entitled
to do this? Surely this is a sign of inconsistency, a lack
of logical ability? This is where there has been a lack of
communication between disciplines. Semanticists who
study the logical structure of natural language know
that this is perfectly legitimate. Natural language does
not cleft neatly into ‘logical’ and ‘non-logical’ elements
simply on the basis of grammar. Take the case of only.
It may not strike one as ‘logical’ immediately. Yet only
interacts with the focus of the sentence—determined
by phonology—to fix the logical form of a stressed
sentence. So for example, the following two sentences:
(a) Sarah only WRITES books.
(b) Sarah only writes BOOKS.
express different propositions: the first is true in
situations where Sarah reads for instance magazines
but no books, the second in situations where Sarah
has quit her job as a gossip columnist. This is not
mere pragmatic adjustment—we are talking here about
truth-conditions of the expressed propositions. From
an inferential point of view, from the first example
we can conclude ‘Sarah doesn’t read books’; from the
second the conclusion ‘Sarah doesn’t write newspaper
columns’ follows. A roughshod translation would
encode the two sentences as having the same form
(perhaps simply into p) since the grammar does not
suggest any differing ‘logical’ aspect—we have to
take phonology (or context) into account to see that—
thereby losing these essentially logical differences
between them.
We see that far from always being obvious, the logic
of sentences is a multifaceted matter. Far from be-
ing described as doing the obvious, the classical logi-
cal reasoner can rather be described as interpreting the
premises in an artful way, involving the understanding
that, given a certain setting, certain parameters of inter-
pretation can be safely ignored, such as when subjects
reason with a quantified statement on an underspeci-
fied domain. Next time you’re tempted to think logic
is obvious—remember all is not what it seems.
Marian Counihan
Philosophy, Amsterdam
Partial words and DNA strings
The bases constituting DNA molecules are adenine,
thymine, guanine and cytosine. They are represented
by the symbols a, t, g, c. Let us set S DNA = {a, t, g, c},
the alphabet of DNA. The order of the bases is called the
DNA sequence or DNA string. This sequence specifies
the exact genetic instructions required to create a par-
ticular organism. A DNA sequence is represented sym-
bolically as attaacggtc. If some mutation occurs and
some positions become unknown then the string shall
look like ataacgtc. This type of string is represented
by partial word. The unknown positions, written as ,
form the set of holes of the partial word.
The comparison of genes motivated the notion of par-
tial word (Berstel J. and Boasson L. 1999: Partial words
and a theorem of Fine and Wilf, Theoretical Computer
Science, 218, 135–141). Alignment of two genes can
be viewed as construction of partial words. In the case
of mutations or alignments of DNA sequences, some
positions occur with the do not know situations. The
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punctured or holed DNA strings follow the properties
of partial words. The various results regarding partial
words are scattered in the literature of different subjects
like theoretical computer science, DNA computing and
combinatorics.
Partial words are defined as partial functions from
the set of natural numbers to an alphabet. The holes
of DNA partial words are studied to understand the bio-
logical point mutation. The puncturedness coefficient of
a partial word is the ratio of the number of holes to the
length of the partial word. This gives a measurement of
the goodness of the partial word. Periodicity of a par-
tial word is the repetition frequency of nucleotide bases.
Frequency ratio is the ratio of the full word to the cor-
responding partial word. At a particular hole, the four
nucleotide bases are assigned frequency ratios. The fre-
quency ratios are obtained from some case study. Some
function, such as maximum of the frequency ratios, de-
termine the exact base at the desired position (Mazum-
dar D., 2008: Proceedings of GAM).
Words are important to any model of computing. The
concept of partial words was first introduced in Berstel
and Boasson’s work (1999: 135–141). This work was
to revisit a theorem of Fine and Wilf (1965: Unique-
ness theorem for periodic functions, Proceedings of the
American Mathematical Society, 16, 109–114). Berstel
and Boasson extended some properties to partial words.
But the main hindrance was that the results were con-
fined to partial words with one hole. Some results failed
when there were two or more holes.
To overcome the problem, Blanchet-Sadri and
Hegstrom (2002: Partial words and a theorem of
Fine and Wilf revisited, Theoretical Computer Science,
270(1/2), 401–419) revisited the landmarking work of
Berstel and Boasson. They redefined the concepts and
proved some new results. Later Blanchet-Sadri et al.
proved some results regarding partial words with one
hole, two holes, three holes and any number of holes.
Most of the contributions to partial words are basically
on periodicity. The partial words considered in these
works have two periodicities.
Languages of partial words have been investigated
in the works of Leupold (2004: Languages of partial
words, Grammars, 7, 179–192). Some results on more
than two periods are derived in the works Castelli M.G.,
Mignosi F. and Restivo A. (1999: Fine and Wilf’s the-
orem for three periods and a generalization of Stur-
mian words, Theoretical Computer Science, 218, 83-
94), Constantinescu S. and Ilie L. (2005: Generalized
Fine and Wilfs theorem for arbitrary number of periods,
Theoretical Computer Science, 339, 49–60), Shur A.M.
and Konovalova Y.V. (2001: On the periods of par-
tial words, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2136,
657-665), Tijdeman R. and Zamboni L. (2003: Fine
and Wilf words for any periods, Indagationes Mathe-
maticae, 14, 135–147). Castelli M.G., Mignosi F. and
Restivo A. (1999: 83-94) extended the theorem of Fine
and Wilf to words having three periods.
Fine and Wilf’s theorem states that if a word has two
periods and its length is at least as long as the sum of the
two periods minus their greatest common divisor, the
word also has as period the greatest common divisor.
Constantinescu and Ilie (2005: 49-60) generalized this
result for an arbitrary number of periods and proved the
optimality of the result.
A very basic problem in all DNA computations is
finding a good encoding. The strands involved should
not exhibit any undesired behaviour like forming sec-
ondary structures (Leupold P. 2005: Partial words
for DNA coding, Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
3384, 224- 234). Various combinatorial properties like
repetition-freeness and involution-freeness have been
proposed to exclude such misbehaviour (Hussini S.,
Kari L. and Konstantinidis S. 2003: Coding properties
of DNA languages, Theoretical Computer Science, 290,
1557–1579; Blanchet-Sadri F., Blair D.D. and Lewis
R.V., 2006: Equations on partial words, Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, 4162, 167–178; Leupold P., 2005:
224–234).
DNA partial words are represented by graphs
(Blanchet-Sadri F. 2004: 71–82). The deformities or
mutational effects of DNA are understood by studying
the connectivity of the graphs. Partial words play a sig-
nificant role in bioinformatics or computational biology.
The computational literature primarily does not focus
on this hole set. Various properties of the hole set can
be explored with biological case studies (Mazumdar D.




Can we consistently say that we cannot
speak about everything?
In In At Most One Thousand Words (The Reasoner
2(7)) I suggested that the paradoxical aspect of the
definition:
(D) the least natural number not definable in En-
glish in at most one thousand words
could and should be avoided by denying that the
implicit quantifiers in D can quantify over D itself.
A natural generalization of that suggestion is the
claim that no intensional object can quantify over it-
self. The duality intensional/extensional is essentially
the same as Frege’s Sinn/Bedeutung distinction. For in-
stance, a definition has an intensional content distinct
from the object defined (if any), a concept/predicate’s
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content is intensional as opposed to the multiplicity of
the objects to which it applies, a proposition is inten-
sional as opposed to its truth value, etc. Once this
is clarified, we can express more formally our general
claim as follows.
Let L be a language and let a model M be a pair
〈UM, IM〉 where UM is a universe of discourse and
IM an interpretation function assigning individuals in
UM to individual constants of L and subsets of Un to
n-ary predicates of L. Let jM be a function assigning
to each well-formed expression φ of L an intensional
object associated with φ in accordance with M. That jM
yields intensional objects means again that jM (φ) is,
in each case, not an individual in UM but its definition,
not a subset of UM but a concept/predicate applying
to the members of a subset of UM, not a truth value
but a proposition about the members of UM, etc. The
principle is then expressed by the formula:
(Q) jM (φ) < UM
As I see it, Q is the translation into logical terms
of a phenomenological eidetic feature of all intentional
acts: no intentional act can be contained in its own
intentional object, restricted in Q to the cognitive
ingredient of intentional acts.
It is an evident consequence of Q that no abso-
lutely unrestricted quantification is possible and, conse-
quently, that all domains of quantification or universes
of discourse are extensible; briefly, that we cannot speak
about everything.
This is also a consequence of the usual model the-
oretic principle that any non empty set is a legitimate
quantification domain and that any such domain is a set.
This principle rests on solid intuitive grounds, since the
following double equivalence seems plausible:
[ a multiplicity M is a completed totality (a set) ] iff [ its
members can be taken as simultaneously given] iff [ it is
possible to simultaneously refer to all of its members ].
Understandably, the claim that we cannot speak about
everything has been deemed self-defeating if express-
ible and thus either inexpressible or false. Indeed, it
seems to involve the same unrestricted quantification it
is supposed to ban.
I attempt to confront here this difficulty.
I pick up a hint from Go¨del. In his famous evaluation
of Russell’s Vicious Circle Principle (1944, p. 135, 136.
“Russell’s Mathematical Logic” in The Philosophy of
Bertrand Russell, Schilpp ed. Northwestern University,
Evanston, IL) he wrote:
For, first of all one may, on good grounds,
deny that reference to a totality necessarily
implies reference to all single elements of it
or, in other words, that “all” means the same
as an infinite logical conjunction. One may,
e.g., follow Langford’s and Carnap’s sugges-
tion to interpret “all” as meaning analyticity
or necessity or demonstrability. There are dif-
ficulties in this view; but there is no doubt
that in this way the circularity of impredica-
tive definitions disappears.
Carnap (e.g., in Carnap 1931, p. 51. “The Logicist
Foundation of Mathematics” in Philosophy of Mathe-
matics, Benacerraf and Putnam eds. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1994) argued for the admissibility of cer-
tain impredicative definitions, for instance the definition
of inductive number as any number possessing all the
hereditary properties of zero:
Ind(x)=DF( f ) (Her( f ) · f (0) ⊃ f (x))
where
Her( f ) =DF (n) ( f (n) ⊃ f (n + 1))
One of the properties quantified over by ‘(f)’ is pre-
cisely being an inductive number. So, how can we
escape circularity in trying to ascertain, for instance,
whether the number 2 is inductive? That is, whether:
( f ) (Her( f ) · f (0) ⊃ f (2))
Carnap answers:
If we had to examine every single property,
an unbreakable circle would indeed result, for
then we would run headlong against the prop-
erty “inductive”. (...) We do not establish spe-
cific generality by running through individual
cases but by logically deriving certain prop-
erties from certain others. In our example,
that the number two is inductive means that
the property ‘belonging to two’ follows logi-
cally from the property ‘being hereditary and
belonging to zero’.
All this suggests that ‘quantifying over’ does not
always mean ‘referring to’. Quantification is not al-
ways extensional; the universal quantifier is some-
times used to mean an intensional entailment between
concepts/properties and the logical necessity stemming
from it. In these cases we can speak of an ‘apparent
quantifier’ and we can always re-phrase the quantified
expression in order to replace the quantifier with an ex-
pression of intensional entailment.
For example, we usually say:
BIV) all propositions are either true or false
WF) no set is self-membered
although neither all propositions nor all sets seem capa-
ble of forming a universe of discourse. I suggest that
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what we really mean in such cases is something like:
BIV’) the concept of proposition implies the feature of
being either true or false
WF’) the concept of set implies the feature of being non
self-membered
Eliminating the apparent quantifier, the impossibility of
absolutely unrestricted quantification can be intension-
ally expressed in this way:





Horwich’s propositional Equivalence Schema and his
associated theory of truth is an advance on the sentential
tradition in which Tarski and his followers have worked.
But, according to Horwich, there is the same, or at least
a similar, problem with the Liar Paradox as bedevilled
Tarski’s theory. I show here that this is a misconception:
a propositional account of truth is entirely clear of any
self-referential paradox of the Liar kind.
Remember, first of all, the way we talk about sen-
tences: by means of referring phrases like ‘p’, ‘the sen-
tence with Go¨del number n’, etc. By contrast, to refer
to a proposition we use forms like ‘that p’, (‘〈p〉’ in
Horwich’s terms) and ‘what John proposed/believed’,
etc. Of course, with sentences we can easily get self-
reference, i.e., we can easily construct a sentence J such
that J = ‘¬T J’. But Tarski’s sentential Truth Schema,
if applied within the same language, is: T ‘p’ ≡ p. So
that leads to the well-known Liar Paradox via the se-
ries of equivalences: ¬T J ≡ ¬T ‘¬T J’ ≡ ¬¬T J ≡ T J.
But suppose we use Horwich’s propositional Equiva-
lence Schema instead, namely: T 〈p〉 ≡ p. Then, ob-
viously, we do not get a contradiction. We can say that
¬T J, since now sentences do not have any truth-value.
But ¬T J ≡ ¬T ‘¬T J’, and not ¬T 〈¬T J〉(≡ T J). It fol-
lows that the contradiction Tarski derived on the sup-
position of semantic closure within the same language
arose through a category mistake, and specifically a use-
mention confusion. If ‘¬T J’ = 〈¬T J〉 then there would
be a contradiction, but that would involve equating a
mentioned sentence with a ‘that’-clause.
There is a further, much more general argument,
however, showing that no contradictions can arise on
a propositional account of truth. That comes from not-
ing, first of all, the following piece of grammar: T 〈p〉 ≡
That p is true ≡ It is true that p ≡ L∗p. That is to say,
Horwich’s ‘That p is true’, while it is of the subject-
predicate form, is equivalent to ‘It is true that p’, which
is of an operator form. More specifically it involves the
operator ‘it is true that’ which is the null or vacuous
operator in the modal system KT. But one modal fact
in KT is that if L∗p ≡ p then it is not the case that
p ≡ ¬L∗p, since KT is consistent. Furthermore, there
is a quite general modal fact regarding all the ‘L’ op-
erators in KT: ¬L(p ≡ ¬Lp). So the conclusion must
be that there are no paradoxical, self-referential propo-
sitions.
But how can it be that there are no paradoxical self-
referential propositions? We can easily form a sen-
tence J∗ such that J∗ = ‘the proposition made by J∗
is not true’. Horwich has considered another case of the
form ‘THE PROPOSITION EXPRESSED (BY THE
SENTENCE) IN CAPITAL LETTERS IS NOT TRUE’
(Horwich, P. 1998, Truth, 2nd Ed., Clarendon, Oxford,
41-2). So surely there must be a contradiction with
these? Don’t we get that G = 〈¬TG〉 (for some ‘G’),
and therefore that ¬TG ≡ ¬T 〈¬TG〉 ≡ TG?
Anyone who thinks so is forgetting the possibility
that no definite proposition is made in such cases, as
there would be if the referring phrase ostensibly refer-
ring to a proposition was replaced by a non-descriptive
demonstrative such as ‘this’ or ’that’. For then it would
follow that the sentence on its own—outside some prag-
matic use—would not state anything definite to be not
true. It follows from the supposed contradiction above,
therefore, that in this place the definite description ‘the
proposition made by J∗’ must be non-attributive, i.e.,
Millian. Likewise with Horwich’s ‘THE PROPOSI-
TION EXPRESSED (BY THE SENTENCE) IN CAP-
ITAL LETTERS’.
But what about the Fixed Point Theorem? It is prov-
able in formal languages of sufficient complexity that,
for any one-place predicate ‘P’ in the language there
is a sentence ‘p’ such that p ≡ P(#‘p’), where #‘p’
is the Go¨del number of ‘p’. So taking ‘P’ to be ‘is
not the Go¨del number of a true sentence’ a mathemati-
cally demonstrable case of paradoxical self-reference is
obtained—assuming truth is taken to be a property of
sentences. Cannot something similar be proved when
truth is taken to be a property of propositions? Here
one must remember Go¨del’s First Incompleteness The-
orem, for instance, which showed that the undecidable
formula ‘(x)¬Bew(x, g)’ must have non-standard inter-
pretations, which means that this sentence may be used
to express an unlimited number of propositions. Of
course, at the more mundane level of natural languages,
there are many sentences that can be used to make an
unlimited number of propositions—those with normal
indexicals in them, such as ‘now’, ‘then’, ‘here’, ‘there’,
and the previous ‘this’, ‘that’. But such indexicality
has been deliberately excluded in formal languages, and
that has meant that the distinction between sentences
and the propositions they may be used to express has
been largely lost, in the associated logical tradition. The
result that Go¨del proved, however, shows that a kind of
indexicality is inescapable in languages that are suffi-
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ciently rich to accommodate a Go¨del numbering of the
sentences within them. And that shows that the categor-
ical distinction between sentences and propositions has
to be retained. More specifically, it means that, while
the sentences in some language might be numbered, the
propositions those sentences might be used to make are
numberless. So there is no Fixed Point Theorem for
propositions.
Hartley Slater





Logic in the Humanities, Social and Com-
putational Sciences
Recent decades have seen major changes in the field
of logic. Moving far beyond the traditional emphasis
on philosophical argument, formal grammar or mathe-
matical proof, modern logic has become a much richer
inter-discipline which transcends the usual borderlines
between academic ‘cultures’.
Within the framework of logic, ideas from one dis-
cipline can effectively cross into another. E.g., it has
been suggested that conversation can be modeled as
computation, thus taking a paradigm from the physical
sciences into the humanities. But by the same token,
modern computation can be understood as conversation
between different processors, in which case ideas from
the humanities enter the computational sciences. At the
same time there is a more societal dimension to this fun-
damental theory: enhancing rational communication is
of eminent practical value in the world today, both in ed-
ucation and in the development of effective and human-
oriented information technology.
A full analysis of these issues requires a common lan-
guage and a framework which makes major structures
visible across the humanities, social, computational and
cognitive sciences and integrates them into comprehen-
sive systems. Logic has played this role in the past
for the foundations of the sciences, computation, and
the semantics of natural languages. The EUROCORES
programme “LogICCC” is based on the firm conviction
that present-day logic will continue to play this role in
the much broader setting described here.
The EUROCORES programme “LogICCC–
Modelling Intelligent Interaction: Logic in the
Humanities, Social and Computational Sciences”—
with a budget of 6.5 Million Euros supported by 13
national funding organizations—has invited researchers
from a wide variety of disciplines to team up. Some of
these researchers are logicians, others are not. But what
all participants in LogICCC projects have in common is
their interest in understanding interaction, pursued with
the common language and models provided by logic in
its modern, pluriform, and outward-looking guise.
Further information: http://www.esf.org/logic
The LogICCC Projects
Computational Foundations of Social Choice
(CFSC) CFSC will address some of the key issues
in computational social choice, an interdisciplinary
field of study at the interface of social choice theory
and computer science. It aims at deepening our under-
standing of algorithmic and complexity-theoretic issues
in social choice, at developing logic-based languages
for modeling and reasoning about choice problems
and preference structures, and at applying established
techniques from AI, such as preference elicitation and
learning, to problems of collective decision making.
Project Leader: Felix Brandt, University of Munich
Further information: http://www.tcs.ifi.lmu.de/
˜brandtf/cfsc.html
Dialogical Foundations of Semantics (DiFoS) In-
corporating interaction and dialogue into logical
semantics promises to overcome certain shortcomings
of more traditional static approaches. The DiFoS
project aims to assess the foundational value of dia-
logue semantics and examine its potential to lay the
foundations for logical reasoning in mathematics, com-
puter science and linguistics. It will compare dialogical
and game-theoretical semantics with inferentialist
approaches, and also investigate the historical roots of
dialogues in logic, especially within medieval theories
of obligationes.




Games for Analysis and Synthesis of Interactive
Computational Systems (GASICS) This project
studies game theoretic formalizations of interactive
complex computational systems and algorithms for
their analysis and synthesis. Our goal is to overcome
the limitations of the existing notions of games played
on graphs, introduced by computer scientists, most of
them being of the kind “two players-zero sum”. We
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aim to extend them to “multiple players-nonzero sum”
games, and show the applicability of the new theory to
the analysis and synthesis of interactive computational
systems.




The Logic of Causal and Probabilistic Reasoning in
Uncertain Environments (LcpR) The project com-
bines expertise from probability logic and nonmono-
tonic reasoning, probability and coherence, causality,
conditional independence, models, human reasoning
and empirical research on mental probability logic,
counterfactuals and cognitive development.
It focuses on:
(i) foundational topics like rationality and evolution;
(ii) algorithms and implementation of local knowledge
representation in non-graphical models (alterna-
tives to Bayesian networks);
(iii) actual human reasoning in children and adults.
Project Leader: Gernot Kleiter, University of Salzburg
Further information: http://www.users.sbg.ac.
at/˜probnet/
Logic for Interaction (LINT) LINT is a collabora-
tive research project aimed at developing mathematical
foundations for interaction. Intelligent interaction
involves agents in complex scenarios like conversation,
teamwork, or games. Contours of a broad mathematical
description are starting to emerge today, based on sev-
eral individual research developments that now need to
be brought together. LINT gathers logicians, computer
scientists and philosophers from six European countries
in an effort to lay the grounds for a unified account of
the logic of interaction.
Project Leader: Dag Westerståhl, Go¨teborg University
Logical Models of Reasoning with Vague Infor-
mation (LoMoReVi) Vagueness is a ubiquitous
phenomenon pervading almost all forms of human
interaction. This project focuses on logical aspects
of processing vague information and aims at formal
models that may serve as bridges between deductive
fuzzy logics and various theories of vagueness. It
also examines relations to other forms of imperfect
information and connections to data extraction.
Project Leader: Christian Fermu¨ller, Vienna University
of Technology
SOCIAL SOFTWARE for elections, the allocation
of tenders and coalition/alliance formation (SSEAC)
All familiar election systems are known to have very
bad properties and to yield counterintuitive results. The
same holds for the allocation of tenders, resulting in
many cases in court. In this project we want to study
the topics mentioned above in the new framework
recently introduced by Balinski and Laraki, avoiding
the paradoxes. Making use of relational reasoning we
will develop appropriate software.
Project Leader: Jose´ Luis Garcia Lapresta, Universidad
de Valladolid
Vagueness, Approximation, and Granularity
(VAAG) Vagueness is a pervasive property of human
language and cognition. While vagueness has often
been regarded as undesirable, the VAAG project is
based on a growing recognition that vagueness is
actually in many respects useful. The VAAG project
targets a broad, interdisciplinary reassessment of
vagueness with contributions to general cognitive
science, linguistic semantics, experimental psychology,
formal pragmatics and computer science.






The Deontic Logic Wiki
Almost sixty years have already passed since deon-
tic logic first entered the realm of modern logic with
Von Wright (1951: Deontic Logic, Mind, 1-15). In a
nutshell, deontic logic concerns the formal analysis of
normative concepts such as obligations, rights, permis-
sions, and the study of the formal patterns typically in-
volved in reasoning with such notions. Since its birth
the field has quickly developed, fostered by the interac-
tion of modal logic and philosophical disciplines typi-
cally interested in norms such as ethics and legal theory.
In 1991, deontic logic came “officially” in con-
tact with computer science thanks to the 1st interna-
tional conference of Deontic Logic in Computer Sci-
ence (DEON’91), which was held in Amsterdam. Such
encounters substantially increased the interdisciplinar-
ity of the field, and since then the biannual DEON con-
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ferences have become a forum for the interaction of re-
searchers coming from such different scientific back-
grounds as logic, philosophy, legal theory, computer
science and artificial intelligence.
What the researchers working on deontic logic still
missed was the web analogue of the DEON conference,
that is, a website that could serve as an active research
tool for the community. With this aim in mind Leon van
der Torre and Davide Grossi have launched the Deontic
Logic Wiki, a website incorporating a database of peo-
ple, events, publications (including comprehensive bib-
tex references), allowing the typical wiki functionalities
which made sites like wikipedia so broadly used. The
Deontic Logic Wiki has been presented on the occasion
of the 9th International Conference on Deontic Logic in
Computer Science (DEON’08), held at the University
of Luxembourg from July 16th to 18th 2008, with the
hope that it will become a stable reference for the field.
Davide Grossi
Computer Science, Luxembourg
Workshop on Logic, Language, Informa-
tion and Computation, 1–4 July
WoLLIC (Workshop on Logic, Language, Information
and Computation) is a series of annual international
workshops where about two dozen researchers in pure
and applied logic, selected by a stiff competition, meet
to report and discuss their work, while leading figures in
the field give invited lectures and tutorials. The centre
of gravity of these workshops is in computing applica-
tions of logic, but many other areas are covered, ranging
from mathematical proof theory to formal semantics of
natural languages.
This year’s workshop in Edinburgh was the 15th
WoLLIC. There were seven invited speakers. Olivier
Danvy presented an abstract machine which allows
smooth and intuitive translations between different se-
mantics in object-oriented programming. Anuj Dawar
gave evidence that linear algebra can provide natural ex-
tensions of fixed-point logic with counting, which may
shed light on the old problem of finding a logic that ex-
presses exactly the polynomial-time computable prop-
erties of finite structures. Makoto Kanazawa described
uniform and efficient algorithms for parsing in mildly
context-sensitive languages, using Datalog queries and
building on Earley magic sets. Sam Lomonaco intro-
duced the main ideas of quantum computing, against
a background of quantum measurement, quantum tele-
porting and quantum knot systems. Mark Steedman ar-
gued for a view of natural language semantics in which
various expressions that have generally been taken as
existential quantifiers should in fact be read as Skolem
terms, and ambiguities in the supposed scopes of these
quantifiers are in fact different readings projected from
the lexicon as a result of different syntactic derivations.
Henry Towsner reported recent proof-theoretic work
in ergodic Ramsey theory, where the Go¨del Dialectica
interpretation interacts powerfully with more classical
techniques. Nikolay Vereshchagin presented new re-
sults on notions of winnability for game semantics for
affine and intuitionistic logics.
There were twenty-one contributed papers, from re-
searchers in fourteen different countries. These covered
the following topics among others: uncertain reason-
ing, many-valued logic, fuzzy logic, variable-binders,
the modelling of incomplete derivations, diagrammatic
logics for reasoning about graphs, automata character-
isations of conjunctive grammars, a recasting of possi-
ble world semantics to allow more distinctions between
meanings, Skolem functions in linguistics, second-
order monadic groupoidal quantifiers, the semantics of
IF logic when nesting of quantifiers is allowed, logics
of belief revision, logics for CCS programs, the power
of memory logics, logics for specifying complex plan-
ning goals, domain-theoretic implementations of the Pi-
card operator, measures of information content based on
Kolmogorov complexity, infinitely-often one-way func-
tions in cryptography, automated repair of inconsistent
ontologies, quantum algorithms. There were special
sessions on the functional interpretation of direct com-
putations, and on how to write and review scientific pa-
pers. There was also a showing of George Csicsery’s
film ‘Julia Robinson and Hilbert’s Tenth Problem’.
Wilfrid Hodges
Mathematics, Queen Mary, University of London
Computation and Cognitive Science, 7–8
July
The conference, held at King’s College, Cambridge,
was lively: in place of formal presentations, all pa-
pers were pre-circulated to the participants, with each
speaker speaking only briefly to introduce their paper,
followed by a detailed one hour discussion. The discus-
sions were spirited and constructive, and all delegates
got involved.
William Bechtel (UCSD) opened the conference by
arguing that cognitive science is moving away from a
tradition of computational ‘modelling-first’ strategies to
‘decomposition-first’ strategies, where the decomposi-
tion is primarily structural rather than functional, as il-
lustrated by recent work on circadian rhythms.
Kenneth Aizawa (Centenary College) argued that tra-
ditional notions of computation in terms of Turing-
equivalence do not do justice to the practice of cogni-
tive neuroscience, or to the history of the way in which
the concept entered the sciences. The notion of compu-
10
tation has the rhetorical flourish of a ‘high value con-
cept’, but its content takes radically different forms in
different sciences.
Frances Egan (Rutgers) argued for a deflationary way
of understanding mental content: it is a purely heuris-
tic gloss in syntactic accounts in cognitive science. She
used this to defend Chomsky’s view that talk of repre-
sentation is dispensable in cognitive science, but also to
explain why we still feel drawn to employ it.
Chris Eliasmith (Waterloo) argued that the best way
of understanding computation in the brain is in terms
of non-linear control theory. Control theory is more ex-
planatory, predictive, and better suited to manipulation
than its main rivals: traditional computation theory, dy-
namical systems theory, and statistical models.
Gualtiero Piccinini (University of Missouri, St.
Louis) argued that notions of information processing
are often confused with notions of computation. Var-
ious notions of information (Shannon, natural, non-
natural) criss-cross with notions of computation (dig-
ital, generic, semantic, non-semantic), and should be
carefully distinguished.
Richard Samuels (Ohio State) argued that the frame
problem facing central cognitive processes should not
rule out an account of those processes in terms of a clas-
sical computational theory of mind. The frame problem
should be distinguished from problems involving rele-
vance and holism, but none are obviously insurmount-
able to a classical model.
Oron Shagrir (Hebrew University) argued that the no-
tion of computation deployed in cognitive neuroscience
is best understood as a species of analogue computation.
Relations between computational states should mirror
the relations between the features in the world that those
states represent.
Mark Sprevak (King’s College, Cambridge) argued
that the possession of representational content is a nec-
essary condition on any process counting as a computa-
tion. Contra purely syntactic and functional accounts of
computation, a computational description is a semantic
description, and its semantic content may include ab-
stract entities like numbers, as well as distal content.
Daniel Weiskopf (South Florida) argued that recent
attempts to reduce linguistic understanding to manipu-
lations of a common sensorimotor computational code
in embodied cognition can and should be resisted.
A forthcoming special issue of Studies in History and
Philosophy of Science is devoted to the papers. PDFs of
drafts of the papers, and full details of the conference,
are available from the conference website.
Mark Sprevak
King’s College, Cambridge
Sixth Bayesian Modelling Applications
Workshop, 9 July
The Bayesian Modelling Applications Workshop pro-
vides a forum for exchanging research questions and
insights, methodologies, techniques, and experiences
with applications of Bayesian models to various prob-
lem domains. The sixth edition took place in Helsinki,
Finland, on July 9 and had ‘bias’ as a special theme.
The two morning sessions addressed bias in model
elicitation, with a focus on probabilities in the first ses-
sion. Colette Thomas (Observations from field trials
with several elicitation techniques in an ecological do-
main) presented experiences with five techniques for
probability elicitation, identifying some problems and
concluding that, once used to assessing probabilities,
her expert subjects preferred a matrix format. In the
second presentation, Bram Wisse (Relieving the elici-
tation burden of Bayesian Belief Networks) presented
the EBBN method, which can be viewed as a canonical
model for general discrete variables and an alternative
for noisy-MAX. Not being able to model synergistic ef-
fects was identified as being a potential problem, not
only in the EBBN method, but also for the approaches
presented in the first two papers of the second session.
No ‘explaining away’, was the reason given by
Hannes Wettig (A Bayesian approach to learning in
fault isolation) for why their models, trained and per-
forming well on single faults, were unable to detect
multiple faults occurring in trucks. In practice no prob-
lem however: other faults will be detected in the work-
shop when the truck is sent off for repair. Explaining
away competing hypotheses will be the next step in ex-
tending the HMF approach presented by Sicco Pier van
Gosliga (Hypothesis Management Framework: a flexi-
ble design pattern for belief networks in decision sup-
port systems). The HMF framework is intended as a
practical tool in situations where multiple users work
with evolving models, for example in the context of
criminal investigations. Whether network construction
is made more easy using a CIM-enabled interface was
investigated and presented by Mike Farry (An experi-
mental procedure for evaluating user-centered methods
for rapid Bayesian network construction) who demon-
strated the problems users have to distinguish between
evidence and belief, and the effects of positive and neg-
ative phrasing upon creation and interpretation of mod-
els.
In the afternoon, Marek Druzdzel (The impact of
overconfidence bias on practical accuracy of Bayesian
network models: an empirical study) showed how the
effects of systematic bias can be studied. He concluded
that underconfidence has a serious effect on accuracy,
more so than random noise; overconfidence, often dis-
played by humans, seems to have only a minor effect
on accuracy. Different approaches for explicitly captur-
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ing known bias were presented by Eric Carlson (Meth-
ods for representing bias in Bayesian networks), who
argued that sometimes making known bias explicit is
more insightful than correcting for it. The afternoon
also found Adnan Darwiche and Rina Dechter present-
ing the results of a probabilistic inference evaluation
held prior to the workshop.
All in all it was an interesting day and all papers
presented can be found in the online proceedings, or
through the workshop’s website.
Silja Renooij
Information and Computing Sciences, Utrecht
Third International Conference on Inter-
disciplinary Social Sciences, 22–25 July
Blessed by cooler weather than is usual for Tuscany
in the summer, the Third International Conference
on Interdisciplinary Social Sciences took place at the
Monash University Centre in Prato’s Palazzo Vaj (an
historic structure without air conditioning) from 22
to 25 July, 2008. Almost 400 delegates from 32
countries attended the meeting to present their work
in parallel sessions and listen to plenary addresses
from Laurie Johnson (University of Southern Queens-
land), Michael Neocosmos (Global Movements Pro-
gram, Monash South Africa), Leela Fernandes (Rut-
gers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey), Jan
Nederveen Pieterse (University of Illinois, Urbana-
Champaign), Barclay Hudson (Fielding Graduate Uni-
versity, California), and Constantine Skordoulis (Uni-
versity of Athens, Greece), whose paper was read by
Eugenia Arvanitis of the Greek Ministry of Education.
Johnson’s talk was entitled ‘Ill Disciplined (Bod-
ies of Thought)’ and reported on an instance of disci-
plinary boundary crossing that prompted a deeper look
at the meaning of an old and unresolvable philosophi-
cal issue. Neocosmos spoke on ‘Rethinking the Post-
Developmental State in Africa Today,’ suggesting that
politics is distinct from and transcends policies. Fernan-
des’ talk was entitled ‘Ethics, Politics and Transnational
Feminist Knowledge: Regimes of Visibility and Invisi-
ble Practices.’ She offered an analysis of transnational
feminist scholarship that proposed ‘a broader method-
ological approach that can address three dimensions
of knowledge production: epistemological..., ontolog-
ical... and the ethical.... By focusing on these questions
in terms of methodology my intention is to approach
knowledge as a set of practices that can be both decon-
structive and constructive and move beyond more static
discussions of power/knowledge.’ Professor Pieterse
led his audience on a grand tour of contemporary glob-
alism and the emerging field of global studies that seeks
to understand it. Barclay in his turn reminded us of
the historian Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), whose grasp
of historiography and the rise and fall of civilizations
can show us a thing or two today, perhaps muting our
smugness. Under the title ‘Space Conceptualisation in
the Context of Postmodernity: In Search of a Cultural
Logic’ Skourdoulis’ paper encouraged social scientists
to rethink their use of space as a metaphor for repre-
senting the postmodern era. Rather than remain trapped
in the contradiction of substantive and relational space,
we would do better to study the various forms of spatial
representation.
Some of the lively coffee-break conversation con-
cerned the importance of bringing the scholarship of in-
terdisciplinarity into the foreground. This conference
gathered together knowledge workers from many do-
mains of social science, yet simply bringing the disci-
plines together does not create actual interdisciplinary
work. It is likely that next year’s International Con-
ference on Interdisciplinary Social Sciences will begin
with some explicit examination of interdisciplinarity, its
nature and challenges.
The closing plenary session of the conference was de-
voted to a sharing by ‘talking circle’ groups who in the
preceding 45 minutes had been reflecting on their expe-
rience at the conference and the themes and ideas that
emerged. Central among the discussion was the sense
that there had been a spirit of mutual support and collab-
oration. People made personal connections. Scholarly
work need not be cold and abstract with such relation-
ships. The scope and scale of the work discussed at the
conference was open.




What (Good) is Historical Epistemology?
24–26 July
The title question of the conference held at the Max
Planck Institute for the History of Science (Berlin) was
primarily framed by the organizers (Uljana Feest and
Thomas Sturm) in order to clarify certain topical rela-
tionships; namely, what good has historical epistemol-
ogy (HE) been for historiographical concerns within the
history of science? What good has HE been as a pos-
sible contributor to the history of epistemology? And
finally, can HE be of any good to traditional epistemo-
logical concerns, such as the nature of justification and
belief? The conference, all in all, aimed at presenting
various available conceptions of HE to a philosophical
audience that has up to now often neglected it.
After three intensive days and about twenty-one pre-
sentations by philosophers, historians, and sociologists
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(and various combinations thereof), and many lively
discussions, what became clearer were many possible
answers, approaches and interpretations to the title and
associated questions. It would be impossible to present
all these here, but some key aspects should suffice to
give an impression of this important event. Before we
begin, it might be of interest to note some of the more
prominent participants of the conference: Lorraine Das-
ton, Daniel Garber, Michael Friedman, Philip Kitcher,
Martin Kusch, Sandra Mitchell, Ju¨rgen Renn, Hans-
Jo¨rg Rheinberger, Robert J. Richards, Barry Stroud,
Catherine Wilson and M. Norton Wise. The number
of audience members came to nearly one-hundred and
twenty.
Generally speaking, some seemed to approach the
main question by contrasting HE to what it may not be;
namely to things like history of epistemology, history of
knowledge practices, and the philosopher’s reconstruc-
tive history. Along with Thomas Sturm’s (Berlin) paper,
Lorraine Daston’s (Berlin) characterization of HE, for
instance, was a good example of this approach. She sug-
gested that HE be understood as standing in a contin-
uum between the history of knowledge practices and the
history of epistemology; where HE examines the emer-
gence and articulation of novel epistemological cate-
gories and problems in the sciences out of knowledge
practices. Dan Garber (Princeton), however, seemed
to feel by the end that none of these should be dis-
tinguished from HE, and both Hans-Jo¨rg Rheinberger
(Berlin) and Jean Franc¸ois Braunstein (Paris) reminded
us of the contingent nature of these distinctions, espe-
cially upon language, national traditions and discipline
formation.
Another approach to the question was to relate HE to
traditional philosophical epistemology, which became,
more specifically, the question: what good is history
to epistemology? In the main, there seemed to be two
ways in which this was answered: by either expand-
ing the traditional notion of epistemology, or by show-
ing how history may be included into its traditional
task. Uljana Feest (Berlin) provided an instance of
the former. In answering her question—what kind of
HE is provided by studying “epistemic objects”?—she
claimed that unlike the concern of the philosopher of
science with justification of theory and results, her fo-
cus was rather the norms of the concepts used in ex-
perimental design; in other words, the focus is on the
process rather than the justification of results. Barry
Stroud (Berkeley), in contrast, provided a good exam-
ple of the latter, in suggesting that history might come
into play as a ‘diagnostic’ to a stalemate between diver-
gent solutions to a traditional epistemological problem.
This came also close to Philip Kitcher’s (New York)
keynote address, where he suggested that the epistemol-
ogist should actually enter the ‘historical laboratory,’
which may possibly help her not only to resolve difficult
cases in philosophy, but also to historically answer a
traditional epistemological question: how do you iden-
tify good methods for changing beliefs? Along with
Michael Heidelberger (Tu¨bingen) and Sandra Mitchell
(Pittsburgh), Kitcher’s address attempted to combine
HE with another approach to epistemology, natural-
ism. In making such a connection, they were actu-
ally advancing a new version of HE. It remains to be
seen, as Michael Friedman (Stanford) noted in discus-
sion, whether such a task is a coherent one, considering
that notions like ‘knowledge’ and ‘object’ may not be
treated in the same way as ‘organisms’, for instance,
are in science.
Due largely to the philosophical tenor of these is-
sues the inverse problem—what good is epistemology
to history?—was discussed far less; but when it was,
what became evident was that the historian’s concep-
tion of epistemology seemed much broader than tra-
ditional philosophical conceptions. Where the two—
philosophical approaches to HE and those in the history
of science—may have converged was in their mutual
recognition in the importance of identifying where, his-
torically, epistemological questions come from. Apart
from these two approaches, I can only mention Martin
Kusch’s (Cambridge) three historiographical desiderata
for any HE, and Hasok Chang’s (London) memorable
paper, which advanced a kind of ‘activist’ approach to
reviving ‘killed’ scientific entities in light of his notion
that even such entities embody (scientific?) knowledge.
Omar W. Nasim
History of Art, Florence
History of Science, Berlin
First Formal Epistemology Festival, 28–30
July
The background for the first Formal Epistemology Fes-
tival on Conditionals and Ranking Functions in Kon-
stanz, Germany, was the 40th anniversary of Robert
Stalnaker’s A Theory of Conditionals and the 20th an-
niversary of Wolfgang Spohn’s Ordinal Conditional
Functions. A Dynamic Theory of Epistemic States.
Besides the organizers Franz Huber, Eric Swanson,
and Jonathan Weisberg, the other speakers were Igor
Douven, David Etlin, Anthony Gillies, Alan Ha´jek,
Hannes Leitgeb, Sarah Moss, Hans Rott, Wolfgang
Spohn, Robert Stalnaker, Robert Williams, and Timo-
thy Williamson. We will summarize four of the talks.
Robert Stalnaker opened the festival with his talk
Nested Conditionals and Iterated Belief Revision. He
drew a comparison between the iteration of modal op-
erators and iterated belief revision. The former was ac-
counted for by Kripke-style accessibility relations. To
account for the latter, Stalnaker argued that we have to
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add structure to the belief model. This can partly be
done by using conditionals to represent belief revision
policies and thereby making belief dynamics explicit.
We also have to understand the input as including meta-
information. Stalnaker gave examples that showed that
sometimes new information does not yield a change of
our beliefs in atomic propositions, but a change of our
belief revision behavior and thereby a change of our be-
liefs about conditionals.
Wolfgang Spohn’s talk Objectivizing Ranking Func-
tions explained the extent to which ranking functions
that describe subjective doxastic states, i.e. subjective
grades of disbelief, can be objectively true or false. The
basic idea is to uniquely associate propositions that can
be true or false with how a given feature is realized
in a ranking function and then to uniquely reconstruct
the functions from these associated propositions. This
works sometimes, and sometimes it does not. The most
exciting positive example is direct causation, which can
be an objective notion even though its basic explication
is a subjective one via ranking functions.
In his talk Conditionals and Actuality, Timothy
Williamson explored the possibilities for adding a con-
nective for indicative conditionals to a formal language
containing an actuality operator. For this, he set up a
number of plausible assumptions including an axiom
for the actuality operator for an otherwise unspecified
propositional language. He then showed that if reflexiv-
ity and distribution hold for the indicative conditional, a
number of unintuitive consequences arise, since the in-
dicative conditional must then behave like the material
conditional in a wide range of cases.
Alan Ha´jek’s talk Arrows and Haloes: Probabilities
of Conditionals and Desire as Belief focused on the
similarities between the debates about the thesis that
probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabili-
ties, and about the thesis that the extent to which we
desire a proposition to be the case is equal to our degree
of belief in the goodness of this proposition. Central to
both debates are the triviality results of Lewis. But these
results can be avoided in both cases by adopting index-
ical interpretations of the conditional and the goodness
operator, respectively. Ha´jek discussed further objec-
tions and stressed the importance of an exchange be-
tween the debates.
The festival was the first of a series of small and the-
matically focused events in formal epistemology. The
festivities of 2009 in Ann Arbor will feature Causal
Decision Theory and Scoring Rules; the festivities of
2010 in Toronto will focus on Defeater/Default Logic
and Perception.
Peter Fritz, Robert Michels, Maryia Ramanava,
Alexandra Zinke
Philosophy, Konstanz
European Summer School on Logic, Lan-
guage and Information, 4–15 August
Should you wonder what logicians, linguists, and com-
puter scientists do over the summer, go to the European
Summer School for Logic, Language, and Information
(ESSLLI) and find out all about it. Every year this event
brings together a large community of researchers, both
graduate students and teachers, from various fields re-
lated to reasoning.
The 20th ESSLLI was held at the University of Ham-
burg, and jointly organised by a local organising team
and some staff members from the Institute for Logic,
Language, and Information. In about 50 courses of five
lectures each, spanning two weeks in total, roughly 500
graduate students from 47 different countries were pro-
vided with thorough introductions and state of the art
overviews of a large variety of research fields. A verita-
ble feast for the reasoner.
Clearly, it is impossible even to begin with an
overview of the courses offered at ESSLLI. One course
is discussed in the interview of this Reasoner. To give an
idea, other courses were given by Paul E´gre and Mikae¨l
Cozic on ‘Introduction to the Logic of Conditionals’,
by Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy on ‘Reasoning, games,
action, and rationality’, by Jan Reimann on ‘Random-
ness’, by Hans-Christian Schmitz and Henk Zeevat on
‘Formal and experimental approaches to discourse par-
ticles and modal adverbs’, by Jouko Va¨a¨na¨nen on ‘De-
pendence Logic’, by Jon Williamson and your reporter
on ‘Probabilistic Logics and Probabilistic Networks’,
and by Jelle Zuidema on introduced ‘Grammar induc-
tion and language evolution’. But this is just one se-
lection, and an admittedly biased one, from the many
courses on offer.
One of the special qualities of ESSLLI is that it brings
together so many different disciplines and researchers,
who can find out about neighbouring fields, or even
fields far away, in an informal and efficient way. For
graduate students in particular, it is the perfect shop-
ping centre for ideas and new developments. So if you
are a logician, linguist, or computer scientist and won-




Psychology and Experimental Philosophy: Special is-
sue of the European Review of Philosophy, deadline 1
September.
Dependence Issues in Knowledge-Based Systems:
Special Issue of International Journal of Approximate
Reasoning, deadline 15 September.
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VLDB: Journal Special Issue on Uncertain and Prob-
abilistic Databases, 15 September.
Humana.mente: Volume 8, Models of Time, 15
November.
Sir Karl Popper Essay Prize: British Society for the
Philosophy of Science, deadline 31 December.
Reasoning for change: Special issue of the jour-
nal Informal Logic that will address the relationship




In this section we introduce a selection of key terms,
texts and authors connected with reasoning. Entries
will be collected in a volume Key Terms in Logic, to
be published by Continuum. If you would like to con-
tribute, please click here for more information. If you
have feedback concerning any of the items printed here,
please email thereasoner@kent.ac.uk with your com-
ments.
Antinomy
A pair of contradictory propositions, each of which can
be demonstrated from a valid deductive proof, thereby
giving rise to a contradiction or paradox. Paradigmatic
examples appear in law and jurisprudence, where two
legal judgments, standing as mutually exclusive and
mutually exhaustive alternatives, are both justified by
the same law (or set of laws). As a philosophical term,
‘antinomy’ receives perhaps its most extensive devel-
opment in the critical works of Kant. In the Critique
of Pure Reason, for example, Kant outlines four ‘cos-
mological antinomies’ that deal with the structure of
the universe (or world-whole), the divisibility of mat-
ter, causality, and the existence of God. According to
Kant, the ‘dialectical opposition’ between the ‘thesis’
and ‘antithesis’ of these antinomies results from rea-
son’s attempt to transcend the limits of possible experi-
ence. Other German Idealists, such as Fichte and Hegel,
also develop the term in a philosophical sense. More re-
cently, however, in the works of twentieth century ana-
lytic philosophers, such as Russell, Ramsey, and Quine,
the term ‘antinomy’ is more narrowly applied to prob-
lems of logic and mathematics (including, but not lim-





Lewis (1941-2001) was an eminent, versatile and pro-
lific American philosopher.
Lewis (1973: Counterfactuals, Blackwell) offers a
semantics for counterfactual conditionals. On the ac-
count of Robert Stalnaker (1968: ‘A Theory of Con-
ditionals’ in Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logi-
cal Theory, Blackwell, 98–112), a counterfactual con-
ditional is true if in the possible world most similar to
the actual world in which the antecedent is true, the con-
sequent is true. For example, ‘If I had asked Elaine to
marry me she would have refused’ is true if among those
possible worlds in which I did ask Elaine to marry me
the possible world most similar to the actual world is
one in which she refused.
In addressing de re modality, Lewis (1973, 39-43;
1986: On the Plurality of Worlds, Blackwell) invokes
‘counterpart theory’. I am not agnostic, but, according
to Lewis, I might have been since there is another possi-
ble world in which there is a counterpart of me who is in
fact agnostic. Counterparthood is a relation of similarity
rather than identity: I exist only in the actual world. Our
example counterfactual is true at the actual world, w∗, if
there is a world, j, closely similar to w∗, in which my
counterpart asks Elaine’s counterpart to marry him and
she refuses and there is no world, k, such that k is at least
as similar to w∗ as is j and at k my counterpart proposes
to Elaine’s counterpart and she does not refuse (after
1973: 42). Lewis (1986) defends counterpart theory,
realism about possible worlds and the view that modal
operators are quantifiers over possible worlds.
Lewis (1991: Parts of Classes, Blackwell) provides






IVA: The Eighth International Conference on Intelligent
Virtual Agents, Tokyo, 1–3 September.
Grandeur of Reason: Rome, 1–4 September.
ECCBR: 9th European Conference on Case-Based
Reasoning, Trier Germany, 1–4 September.
10th Asian Logic Conference: Kobe University,
Japan, 1–6 September.
COMSOC: 2nd International Workshop on Compu-
tational Social Choice, Liverpool, 3–5 September.
KES: 12th International Conference on Knowledge-
Based and Intelligent Information & Engineering Sys-
tems, Zagreb, 3–5 September.
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Phlox Workshop: Launch workshop on current is-
sues in metaphysics and the philosophy of language, 3–
5 September.
ICANN: 18th International Conference on Artificial
Neural Networks, Prague, 3–6 September.
BLC: British Logic Colloquium, Nottingham, 4–6
September.
Naturalism: Kazimierz Naturalism Workshop, Kaz-
imierz Dolny, Poland, 6–10 September.
SMPS: Soft Methods for Probability and Statistics,
4th International Conference, Toulouse, 8–10 Septem-
ber.
AiML: Advances in Modal Logic, LORIA, Nancy,
France, 9–12 September.
Causality and Probability in the Sciences
University of Kent, Canterbury UK, 10–12 September
Colloquium Logicum: The biennial meeting of the
German Society for Mathematical Logic, Technische
Universitaet Darmstadt, 10–12 September.
Logic of Change, Change of Logic: Prague, 10–14
September.
MAS&BIO: MultiAgent Systems & Bioinformatics
2008, Cagliari, Italy, 13 September.
NMR: Twelfth International Workshop on Non-
Monotonic Reasoning, Special Session on Foundations
of NMR and Uncertainty, Sydney, 13–15 September.
ICAPS: International Conference on Automated
Planning and Scheduling, Sydney, 14–18 September.
ECML PKDD: The European Conference on Ma-
chine Learning and Principles and Practice of Knowl-
edge Discovery in Databases, Antwerp, Belgium, 15–
19 September.
Spatial Cognition: Schloss Reinach, Freiburg, 15–19
September.
CSL: 17th Annual Conference of the European As-
sociation for Computer Science Logic, Bertinoro, Italy,
15–20 September.
PGM: The fourth European Workshop on Proba-
bilistic Graphical Models, Aalborg, Denmark, 16–19
September.
KRAMAS: Workshop on Knowledge Representation
for Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, Sydney, 16–19
September.
Mathematical Methods in Philosophy: School of
Mathematics, University of Bristol, 19–21 September.
Biotechnology, Past, Present & Future: The Genen-
tech Center for the History of Molecular Biology and
Biotechnology at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, 21–
23 September.
HAIS: 3rd International Workshop on Hybrid Ar-
tificial Intelligence Systems, Burgos, Spain, 24–26
September.
Ontology, mind and language: VIII SIFA National
conference, Bergamo, Italy, 25–27 September.
CLIMA-IX: 9th International Workshop on Compu-
tational Logic in Multi-Agent Systems, Dresden, Ger-
many, 29–30 September.
October
SUM: Second International Conference on Scalable
Uncertainty Management, Naples, 1–3 October.
SETN: 5th Hellenic Conference on Artificial Intelli-
gence, Syros, Greece, 2–4 October.
Reason, Activism, and Change: University of Wind-
sor, 3–5 October.
Formal Modeling in Social Epistemology: Tilburg
Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science, 9–10 Oc-
tober.
ICAI: The 1st International Conference on Advanced
Intelligence, Beijing, 19–22 October.
FotFS VII: Bringing together Philosophy and Soci-
ology of Science, Foundations of the Formal Sciences
VII, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 21–24 October.
Uncertainty Reasoning for the Semantic Web: 4th
International Workshop, in conjunction with the 7th In-
ternational Semantic Web Conference, Karlsruhe, Ger-
many, 26 October.
MICAI: 7th Mexican International Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, Mexico City, 27–31 October.
MDAI: Modeling Decisions for Artificial Intelli-
gence, Barcelona, 30–31 October.
November
Peter Lipton Memorial Conference: Department of
History and Philosophy of Science, Cambridge, 1
November.
LNAT: Logic Now and Then, The Center for Re-
search in Syntax, Semantics and Phonology (CRISSP),
Brussels, 5–7 November.
Automated Scientific Discovery: AAAI Fall Sympo-
sium, Arlington, Virginia, 7–9 November.
WPE: Workshop on Philosophy and Engineering,
The Royal Academy of Engineering, Carlton House
Terrace, London, 10–12 November.
Health in context: A short course in multilevel mod-
elling for public health and health services research,
Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal, 10–14
November.
Nature and Structure: Philosophy of Physics Grad-
uate Student Conference, SUNY at Buffalo, 15 Novem-
ber.
Propositions: Ontology, Semantics, and Pragmatics:
Venice, Italy, 17–19 November.
Physics Meets Biology:: Perspectives from Philoso-
phy, History, and Science, Royal Society of Edinburgh,
18–20 November.
Game Theory: 5th Pan-Pacific Conference in Game
Theory, Auckland, 19–21 November.
16
December
Inference, Consequence, and Meaning: Sofia, 3–4 De-
cember.
ICLP: 24th International Conference on Logic Pro-
gramming, Udine, Italy, 9–13 December.
CIMCA: International Conference on Computational
Intelligence for Modelling, Control and Automation,
Vienna, Austria, 10–12 December.
Trends in Logic VI: Logic and the foundations of
physics: space, time and quanta, Brussels, Belgium,
11–12 December.
ICDM: 8th IEEE International Conference on Data
Mining, Pisa, 15–19 December.
PRICAI: Tenth Pacific Rim International Conference
on Artificial Intelligence, Hanoi, Vietnam, 15–19 De-
cember.
January 2009
LFCS: Symposium on logical foundations of computer
science, Deerfield Beach, Florida, 3–6 January.
SODA: ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algo-
rithms, New York Marriott Downtown, 4–6 January.
Biomolecular Networks: from analysis to synthesis,
Pacific Symposium on Biocomputing, Fairmont Orchid,
The Big Island of Hawaii, 5–9 January.
3rd Indian Conference on Logic and its Application:
The Institute of Mathematical Sciences, Chennai, India,
7–11 January.
VAF 2009: 3th Conference of Dutch Flemisch As-
sociation for Analytical Philosophy, Tilburg University,
the Netherlands, 22–23 January.
Bayesian Biostatistics: Houston, Texas, 26–28 Jan-
uary.
February
ACM International Conference on Intelligent User
Interfaces: Sanibel Island, Florida, 8–11 February.
AIA: IASTED International Conference on Artificial
Intelligence and Applications, Innsbruck, Austria, 16–
18 February.
March
Models and Simulations 3: Charlottesville, Virginia, 3–
5 March.
ADS’09: Agent-Directed Simulation Symposium,
Part of the 2009 Spring Simulation Multiconference,
San Diego, California, 22–27 March.
CSIE 2009: 2009 World Congress on Computer
Science and Information Engineering, Los Ange-
les/Anaheim, 31 March–2 April.
April
Foundations of Math: New York University, 3–5 April.
EuroGP: 12th European Conference on Genetic Pro-
gramming, Tu¨bingen, Germany, 15–17 April.
AISTATS: Twelfth International Conference on Ar-
tificial Intelligence and Statistics, Clearwater, Florida
USA, 16–19 April.
May
AAMAS: The Eighth International Joint Conference
on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, Bu-
dapest, Hungary, 11–15 May.
Philosophy and Cognitive Science: The XIXth edi-
tion of the Inter-University Workshop, Zaragoza, 18–19
May.
UR: Uncertain Reasoning, Special Track of FLAIRS,
Island, Florida, USA, 19–21 May.
June
Argument Cultures: Ontario Society for the Study of
Argumentation, Windsor, Canada, 3–6 June.
NA-CAP: Networks and Their Philosophical Im-




Post-doc position: 5-year postdoc position in Mathe-
matical Logic in Lisbon, 10 September.
10 post-doctoral fellowships: University of Sydney
Postdoctoral Research Fellowships 2009, 12 Septem-
ber.
Post-doc position: Graphical probabilistic models for
reliability, University of Luxembourg, 15 September.
Tenured Professorship in Theoretical Philosophy:
University of Cologne, deadline 26 September.
Assistant Professor: Philosophy of science and





MSc in Mathematical Logic and the Theory of Compu-
tation: Mathematics, University of Manchester.
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MA in Reasoning
An interdisciplinary programme at the University of
Kent, Canterbury, UK. Core modules on logical,
causal, probabilistic, scientific and mathematical
reasoning and further modules from Philosophy,
Psychology, Computing, Statistics and Law.
MSc in Cognitive & Decision Sciences: Psychology,
University College London.
Causality Study Fortnight
University of Kent, Canterbury UK, 8–19 September
Physics and Metaphysics: XIth Summer School on
Philosophy of Physics, Cesena, 15–20 September.
Mind as Machine: Department for Continuing Edu-
cation, University of Oxford, 1–2 November.
Philosophy of Psychology: Bochum / Tilburg, First
European Graduate School, Philosophy of Language,
Mind and Science, 10–21 November.
Summer Institute on Argumentation: University of
Windsor, Canada, contact H.V. Hansen or C.W. Tindale,
25 May – 6 June, 2009.
Studentships
PhD Position: Formal Epistemology Research Group,
University of Konstanz, deadline 30 September.
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